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Introduction 
 
 
Train + Equip = Peace? 
Stabilization Requires More Than Capacity Building 
Claudia Major, Christian Mölling and Judith Vorrath 
Should Germany supply weapons to the Kurdish peshmerga forces battling Islamic 
State (IS)? This question aroused intense debate last summer, leading once more to the 
general issue of what role capacity building for third actors can play in crisis manage-
ment. Germany wants to take on more responsibility in foreign policy but is keen to 
avoid direct military involvement as far as possible. Providing training and equipment 
for governments and regional organizations in crisis areas, enabling them to create and 
maintain peace and security by their own efforts, therefore seems sensible. The German 
Government has pursued this approach with its capacity building initiative (‘Ertüchti-
gungsinitiative’) since 2011, which was relabelled ‘Enable and Enhance Initiative’ in 2013. 
However, experience to date clearly reveals its risks and limitations. By providing train-
ing and equipment, Germany can make an important contribution to crisis management. 
But it is not a ‘one size fits all’ solution; on the contrary, it must be context-specific and 
geared towards long-term needs. 
 
On 1 September 2014, the majority of Mem-
bers of the Bundestag backed the German 
Government’s decision to supply Iraq with 
weapons to support its fight against Islamic 
State (IS). The weapons were to be delivered 
to the Iraqi Government for distribution to 
the Kurdish peshmerga forces at the fore-
front of the war against IS. The decision was 
preceded by a sometimes heated debate in 
politics and the media about the pros and 
cons of such assistance. In January 2015, the 
German Parliament approved the Govern-
ment’s proposal for a Bundeswehr training 
mission in northern Iraq. It will comprise 
about 100 Bundeswehr soldiers, who will 
train and advise the Kurdish peshmerga 
fighters for combat against IS. While sup-
plying weapons to the Kurdish fighters 
may be a novelty in the German approach, 
training per se is not. Yet ultimately, both 
decisions indicate the growing interest in 
building the capacity of partners as a con-
flict management tool. 
Capacity building:  
old concept, new interest 
The concept of capacity building – in other 
words, providing advice, training and equip-
ment to strengthen partners’ own capabili-
ties – featured on the agenda long before 
the escalation in Iraq, albeit mostly in the 
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context of broader crisis prevention and 
management efforts. The approach has 
been practised in a comprehensive way 
by the UN for many years, for example in 
security sector reforms. The EU, too, has 
supported military and civilian capacity 
building for some years through missions 
such as EUTM Somalia and EUPOL RD Con-
go. In Germany, this approach has attracted 
more attention since 2011 as a result of the 
Federal Chancellery’s initiative to enable 
partners (then called ‘Ertüchtigungsinitia-
tive’). Originally, the aim was to develop a 
new framework for justifying arms exports 
to problematical target countries, predi-
cated on the notion that Germany and the 
Western countries recognize these states 
as ‘strategic partners’. However, efforts to 
convince the NATO countries to back this 
approach at their 2012 summit in Chicago 
ended in failure. The German Government 
then successfully pitched the idea – now 
relabelled the ‘Enable and Enhance Initia-
tive’ (E2I), with the added dimension of 
capacity building – to the EU in 2013. 
The topic of equipment assistance has 
also become a focus of attention because 
of Germany’s involvement in EU training 
activities. The lesson of the missions in 
Somalia (since 2010) and Mali (since 2013) 
was that police and military training adds 
little value if the requisite equipment is 
lacking. 
In regional terms, these initiatives main-
ly focus on Africa. Indeed, the German 
Government’s new Policy Guidelines for Africa, 
adopted in May 2014, and the debate about 
providing equipment assistance to Tunisia, 
for example (cf. SWP Comments 53/2014), sug-
gest that Germany plans to intensify its 
engagement on this continent in future. 
Not surprisingly, the first test cases that 
Germany and the EU chose in 2014 to apply 
E2I all turned out to be in Africa, starting 
with Mali and Somalia. 
In Africa in particular, programmes that 
aim to build partners’ crisis management 
and stabilization capacities have long been 
an integral part of the toolbox. For example, 
the UN, the EU and bilateral partners are 
assisting African countries and regional 
organizations to develop their civilian and 
military capabilities, notably in Somalia. 
The experience gained to date raises a num-
ber of fundamental questions, however. 
Besides the effectiveness and possible nega-
tive spillover effects of capacity building, 
the scope of these measures also requires 
critical analysis. Strengthening partners’ 
capacities can certainly be successful, but 
it is not a ‘one size fits all’ solution. 
Capacities are not enough 
Ultimately, capacity building is always a 
crisis prevention tool as well. The establish-
ment of functioning security structures not 
only stabilizes the countries themselves; 
it should, ideally, also enable them to con-
tribute to regional stability and crisis pre-
vention. Wide-ranging measures at an 
early stage to reform and strengthen part-
ners’ security sectors could thus serve as a 
positive alternative to (last-minute) arms 
deliveries to authoritarian regimes. This 
preventive approach is very much in line 
with the position defined by Germany in 
the Action Plan ‘Civilian Crisis Prevention, 
Conflict Resolution and Post-Conflict Peace-
Building’ and the coalition agreement. 
A glance at various recent crises, how-
ever, shows that Germany’s and Europe’s 
willingness to commit substantial diplo-
matic, financial and, if need be, military 
resources early on to prevent an escalation 
is still very limited. From our current 
perspective, for example, it is difficult to 
imagine that Germany (or the EU, for that 
matter) would have invested the same 
amount of resources and effort in preven-
tive action in Mali, i.e. before the security 
situation deteriorated in 2012, as it does 
now that the situation has escalated. 
But even if Germany implements its 
proclaimed prevention strategy, it must 
be prepared to assume responsibility for 
the subsequent phases of crisis manage-
ment as well, for the fact is that prevention 
measures can fail. Germany would then 
have a choice: either Berlin accepts that 
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the outcome of many years of development 
and reform efforts is being called into ques-
tion, along with confidence in the Federal 
Government; or attempts are made to avoid 
this scenario, if necessary by military means. 
Generally speaking, capacity building 
should take place over a longer period of 
time. Until Mali’s security forces are fully 
operational and possible flanking security 
sector reforms take effect, for example, 
Europe has a duty to guarantee stability. 
In addition to training, a long-term pres-
ence of international forces is likely to be 
required; Afghanistan is a case in point. 
Germany must be prepared for the fact that 
a mission can mean a lengthy presence in 
the area of deployment. Kosovo, for example, 
is comparatively manageable in size, but 
the international community has been 
engaged here since 1999. 
Mitigating risks, increasing 
prospects of success 
Based on Europe’s experience with enabling 
state and regional partners so far, various 
risks can be identified and lessons learned. 
There is a risk that if a government 
changes or is overthrown, well-trained 
forces and equipment can fall into the hands 
of actors who are opposed to the goals being 
pursued by Germany or the EU in the con-
text of security sector reform. In Mali in 
2013, for example, soldiers trained by the 
US deserted to Islamist groups and then 
fought French troops deployed with Oper-
ation Serval. A very large number of weap-
ons circulating on the black market in West 
Africa come from official stocks, having 
been sold illegally by the security forces. 
Equipment assistance can potentially 
open up export opportunities for German 
industry. However, under the unstable con-
ditions outlined here, it can pose a threat 
to security in the destination areas. 
For that reason, it is important to con-
sider the overall conditions in which capac-
ity building takes place, focusing particu-
larly on political control of the security 
forces. On their own, additional funding, 
training and equipment may, in some 
circumstances, not only prove ineffective; 
in the medium term, they may even be 
counterproductive and jeopardize security. 
What’s more, capacity enhancement may 
enable authoritarian regimes to assert their 
agenda by force, in direct confrontation with 
the domestic opposition and with rivals in 
the immediate neighbourhood – possibly 
indirectly conflicting with Western policies. 
In the past, the frameworks for meaning-
ful capacity building were in some cases 
rudimentary or non-existent. Any capacity 
building measures that are, nonetheless, 
undertaken in these circumstances offer no 
benefits to partners or donors, but simply 
waste resources that are needed elsewhere. 
The EU Border Assistance Mission (EUBAM) 
in Libya, for example, was called into ques-
tion, not only due to the steadily deteriorat-
ing local security situation. When the mis-
sion started, the relevant Libyan authorities 
existed largely on paper, casting doubt on 
whether the training provided to strengthen 
the border services could ever be successful 
without genuine demobilization of militias 
and security sector reform. 
Even under favourable conditions, capac-
ity building only makes sense if substantial 
support is provided. Otherwise, it quickly 
becomes a token gesture or action for its 
own sake, doing little to remedy the actual 
problems of a lack of materiel and facilities. 
The UN and EU, for example, are assisting 
the African Union (AU) to establish the 
African Peace and Security Architecture as 
a regional alternative to deploying their 
own forces. At present, the AU is still heavi-
ly dependent on external support. If the 
five brigades forming the planned African 
Standby Force are to carry out their own 
operations, merely equipping the infantry 
with small arms is not enough, for there is 
also a lack of reconnaissance means, trans-
port aircraft, vehicles and combat helicop-
ters. If Germany wants to make a contribu-
tion here, it should encourage the EU to plan 
for the progressive handover of materiel 
and its monitoring. 
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Much-needed cooperation 
As a rule, capacity building will take place 
in an international framework established 
by the UN, the EU or a coalition of the will-
ing, as is the case with the equipping of the 
Kurdish fighters. Usually, the various actors 
have found it difficult to agree among them-
selves, even within the UN and indeed the 
EU, where the coordination between the 
Commission, the Member States and the 
European External Action Service (EEAS) 
is often deficient. The comprehensive 
approach that all actors claim to be pur-
suing may in some cases result in duplica-
tion of programmes. What’s more, the 
solutions adopted are often only partial: in 
an effort to achieve a consensus, initiatives 
focus solely on those elements of crisis 
management for which stakeholders are 
able to agree common goals. This is the 
reason behind the limited mandates of 
EUTM Mali and EUCAP Nestor in Somalia, 
for example. 
There is clearly a need, then, for consul-
tation and coordination between the crisis 
managers – the UN, the EU, NATO, regional 
organizations, countries and NGOs. This 
is the prerequisite for efficient use of re-
sources, and it also increases the prospects 
of achieving the desired outcomes in the 
field. Security sector reform and provision 
of training and equipment should therefore 
be embedded in a broader framework of 
international engagement. 
For the EU, the most suitable partner is 
the UN, as it has been engaged in Africa for 
much longer, on a larger scale and, to some 
extent, more successfully. Instead of direct-
ly equipping countries where conditions 
are potentially problematical, the Euro-
peans could, as an alternative option, pro-
vide more support for the UN. The UN is by 
far the most significant actor: it currently 
has 17 peacekeeping operations worldwide, 
with 118,043 deployed personnel, including 
83,000 troops. However, many are working 
with outdated equipment and are poorly 
trained. Like the much smaller Netherlands, 
Germany could provide combat helicopters, 
which would make a significant contribu-
tion. Helicopters make a real difference 
in Africa and would cost the Bundeswehr 
no more than deploying troops of its own. 
Three to five helicopters would suffice – a 
manageable number despite the Bundes-
wehr’s acute shortage of materiel. More 
systematic and comprehensive support for 
UN missions would greatly increase Ger-
many’s credibility in crisis management, 
given that no Western country is currently 
providing this type of support. 
Ultimately, it is the acceptance of these 
measures by target groups that will deter-
mine their success, so it is extremely im-
portant to involve regional partners in the 
planning process at a very early stage. 
Conclusion:  
Clear goals, adequate instruments 
It is essential to establish clarity on one’s 
own goals and interests. These are identi-
fied by the EU, for example, in its regional 
strategies for the Sahel and the Horn of 
Africa. A good option is to cooperate with 
regional organizations, such as the AU, 
whose Peace and Security Architecture is 
already receiving substantial support. If 
capacity building for states and regional 
organizations is intended to signal a greater 
commitment to crisis management, then 
Germany must clarify its policy and provide 
additional resources as well as ensure the 
political engagement of the relevant minis-
tries. Otherwise, partners might view train-
ing and equipment assistance as a form 
of ‘low cost leadership’. A more detailed 
analysis of needs is also required. If warfare 
has indeed changed substantially, then the 
toolbox must be adapted accordingly and 
new approaches to crisis management iden-
tified. 
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